Globalization, migration and social development

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ABSTRACT
This paper critically examines assumptions underpinning the alleged benefits of globalization for poorer countries and argues that globalization creates the conditions that are promoting large-scale migration from poorer to richer countries. In conjunction with the programmes of structural adjustment promoted by the north, this undermines local economies and welfare structures and services. In turn, these processes accentuate the existing phenomenon of structural racism, reflected in increasingly harsh policies and attitudes towards migrants amongst northern countries that are creating stronger barriers to most forms of migration. The paper concludes by arguing that community development, informed by the values of social justice, has an important role to play in building bridges between communities and combating racism at local, national and international levels.

KEYWORDS
community development, globalization, migration, racism, refugees, structural adjustment

Globalization: a spur to migration
The term "globalization" is commonly associated with an increasingly dominant process of economic change, whereby economic transactions take place regardless of national jurisdictions. Many in the north argue that globalization is creating new opportunities for poorer countries to benefit from increased trade and investment, thereby stimulating local economies and reducing poverty. However, this view is challenged by others who argue that globalization is mainly benefiting the wealthier nations of the north, leaving the poorer countries of the south to bear the brunt of economic restructuring and adjustment.

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2 This is a shortened version of a paper first given as an International Public Lecture at the Makerere Institute of Social Research, Makerere University, Kampala, October 2002
3 I have used the terms "northern" and "southern" not to reflect geographical realities, but to distinguish between the richer—broadly OECD members—and poorer countries of the world
that globalization represents the construction of a liberal world economic order and brings with it demonstrable benefits in the form not only of free market economies but also liberal forms of representative democracy (Venters 2002). There are profound difficulties with this analysis. Globalization means that the consequences of economic decisions are felt ever more quickly by increasing numbers of those who do not take the decisions and who indeed may be thousands of miles from the site of decision-making. Nations espousing the cause of globalization are themselves less enthusiastic about some of its impacts, increasingly finding that their ability to exercise political and economic control within their boundaries is compromised by footloose economic actors. These actors move capital to labour, free from national controls, as they have done for a century or more, but nowadays also increasingly view the international migration of labour to capital as a good.

The economic benefits of globalization clearly are unevenly distributed. Hirst and Thompson (1999) argue that the global economy hardly touches many parts of the world—except when they provide the source of cheap labour—and that enhanced capital flows are largely limited to exchanges between OECD countries. Globalization in reality opens up new opportunities for growth for the biggest economic players that are increasingly dominating economic activity, free from political accountability. The world's 100 largest economies now includes 50 giant corporations, none of which are controlled indigenously within Africa. The five largest global companies have combined sales greater than the total incomes of the world's 46 poorest nations, the majority of which are also African.

The point about corporate globalization, however, as Milton Friedman—the arch-disciple of neo-liberal economics—once commented, is that such corporations cannot be ethical: their only responsibility is to make profits. The top 200 corporations' sales levels are almost 20 times the combined annual income of the world's 1.2 billion poorest people, accounting for over one quarter of the world's economic activity yet employing less than 1 percent of its workforce. They are also steadily eroding the UN's influence by limiting its ability to regulate their activities in the name of peace and social justice.
This growing, unaccountable power base is one driver of the critique mounted by those arguing for globalization from below, against the work of the World Trade Organization and transnational bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which have imposed neo-liberal economic structural change programmes upon southern countries to open up their markets to exploitation by the north. But whilst the agenda of the north and its major global actors, appears to be to make all economic markets equally open to all nations, the reality is that the north wants to open up the markets of the south to its own products, while maintaining economic barriers and tariffs to protect its own markets from penetration by southern products. This liberalization is wreaking havoc in most poor countries, as French (1996) argues, while agricultural subsidies—currently at the rate of £1 million every two minutes—prop up rich northern farmers. Such subsidies and tariffs mean that most of the value of Africa's rich resource base—coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar, cotton, cobalt, diamonds and other minerals—is not returned to the people of Africa itself.

The impact of structural adjustment programmes driven through by the north after the debt crisis of the 1980s have been profound, most of all on the poorest in poor countries. Oxfam reports that over half the employment in Latin America is now casualized compared with only 10 per cent ten years ago. In sub Saharan Africa, the proportion of those living below the official UN poverty line of about $1 US a day is now two-fifths of the entire population, or about 220 million people and this proportion is increasing. Levels of inequality within African countries are also generally increasing: hardly a ringing endorsement of the impact of the neo-liberal agenda of the past 15 years.

As Opio (2000) and Okidi and Mugambe (2002) suggest from research in Uganda, although most headline economic indicators there show an impressive performance over the past decades, this masks widening social and economic divisions. The government's Poverty Eradication Action Plan, linked to the model of trickle-down development, is failing to halt these widening gaps in income and wealth. Uganda's northern region in particular, and rural areas generally, are suffering from heightened relative poverty, poor literacy and health indicators and a
failure to address the gender imbalance. Opio also argues the need for bottom-up community participation in poverty reduction programmes to halt these trends. The major global economic actors also hold poorer commodity-producing countries in thrall through the mechanism of debt; for example 90 per cent of Brazil’s export earnings now go to service its external debt burden and the picture is broadly similar in many African counties, despite the cancellation of certain debts by some donor nations.

In relation to the development of political ideas and structures, globalization has been seen, not least in Fukuyama’s “end of history thesis”, as the triumph of liberal democracy over alternative forms of political ideology and over socialism and fascism in particular. This political “triumph” is increasingly expressed through transnational structures of governance ranging from the UN and its associated bodies through to the growing number of international organizations concerned with the administration of human rights and justice. However, Fukuyama’s is also a flawed analysis since neither fascist nor socialist ideas are dead and buried: many transnational bodies are undermined politically in practice by more powerful nation states and racialized and divisive forms of governance are emerging in many states. Venters (2002: 8) argues that, whilst in Europe and elsewhere,

new political forms have arisen to address the inadequacies of the state as a problem-solving instrument [ ... to ... ] catch up with debordering economic processes [...] in parts of the “Southern” world, deregulation and insertion into the world economy has produced division, conflict and collective violence....

particularly in the context of weak states and weak civil society. These divisions, often generated or accentuated by post-colonial settlements, develop a racialized momentum of their own, as in Rwanda, the Congo, northern Uganda and southern Sudan, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola and Sierra Leone. The collapse of so-called “weak states” and the growth of inter-ethnic violence has, in turn, led to an acceleration of the processes of inter-state migration which are now troubling the political elites of many western countries and has encouraged, paradoxically, a
growth in fascist and neo-fascist political movements. Globalization has, as the UN itself observes (United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service 2002), directly contributed to migration [and the accompanying phenomenon of growing racism] by weakening the ability of ‘Southern’ countries to generate employment for most of their population, to invest in basic infrastructure and support their own industry, and to allocate resources for health, education and social security.

Globalization thus brings with it clear political and economic threats: first amongst these is the tendency to ideological hegemony. This works at several levels, including in the use of language: what is referred to elsewhere as “the confusion of community” (Craig 1998). The term “community”, and indeed “community development” is now yet again being sprayed in an undifferentiated way on to programmes, initiatives and interventions on a worldwide basis. This is apparent both within western and eastern Europe, for example, where many social programmes are imbued with the communitarian ideas of Etzioni, whose approach draws from both political left and right, and in an African context, where growing misuse of the term “development” obscures what is in reality a process of de-development, underdevelopment or mis-development. Local and national politicians from both left and right, including many uninterested in the values of social justice increasingly, nevertheless, use the language of community in support of political projects. The language of empowerment and participation has now found its way into the agendas of the most powerful agencies concerned with managing the world’s economy and with social development.

A United Nations Human Development Report commented, for example, that, in the face of current challenges for development, “people’s participation is becoming the central issue of our time” (Craig and Mayo 1995). The World Bank, better known for fiscal conservatism than for political and social risk-taking, has argued that community participation can be a means for ensuring that southern development projects reach the poorest in the most efficient and cost-effective way. The language of community is, however, frequently used as a cloak to cover other
political agendas. Many of these agencies give scant attention to issues of social justice, with respecting the dignity and humanity of the poorest, with their right to participate in decisions which affect them or with mutuality and equality: all principles which should underpin the philosophy and practice of social and community development. The way in which the World Bank’s programmes undermine local communities while at the same time appearing to advocate the importance of “community” is one example of the confusion that surrounds this term.

In the face of this confusion about the meaning of the term “community”, most insidiously used now by the north to promote its own worldview under the cloak of the notion of the “international community”, the words of the Chipko people of northern India are salient. Like many of the grassroots environmental NGOs and social development groups assembled in Johannesburg for the Earth Summit in the summer of 2002, they argue that major future economic and political struggles will increasingly be about the sensitive use of limited natural resources as, for example, in the Congo, where 400 illegal logging concessions have been granted and 20 per cent of the forest may be lost in the next 15 years.

The Chipko movement is concerned with preserving the natural regeneration of forests in opposition to the desire of multinational logging companies aiming to exploit timber resources and move on: an experience mirrored in Indonesia and the equatorial rainforests of Africa and Latin America. Years of experience have bred in the Chipko a healthy scepticism of the claims made by some so-called social development experts who claim to bring lasting benefits to the poor. The Chipko argue that local communities are the most competent managers of the resources that sustain them; an approach which multinational companies and outside experts often regard as heretical and threatening to their notion of the natural economic order. These outside “experts”, agents of neoliberalism, have too frequently themselves become the precursors of structural adjustment programmes, social and economic division and the loss of local control over the wealth represented by natural resources.

The Chipko tell a story in the villages about a fox that comes wearing a tiger’s coat to terrify the people. When the real tiger comes, however,
it wears a fox’s coat. The Chipko argue that “we should beware of those who come saying they love the people”, and should treat their claims with this same degree of scepticism. Companies such as Exxon Mobil are typical of this form of “expertise”. Exxon, with its strong links with the Bush family, urged President Bush of the USA (where 5 per cent of the world’s population are responsible for 30 per cent of the world’s environmental damage), not to attend the World Earth Summit, thus undermining the search for sustainable environmental global agreements.

Despite some initiatives by a few companies, these same oil companies, with their records of polluting maritime and terrestrial environments across the world, can hardly claim to be the friends of the poor. The crab in the crab beds of Nigeria’s Ogoni Delta, for example, are now too poisoned by petroleum toxins to be edible. In Colombia, BP has recently received the biggest fine in its history for oilrig pollution, following years of illegal deforestation, water contamination and the dumping of untreated toxic waste. Fortunately, there are more examples in Africa that give us more hope, such as partnerships for water and sanitation in Central Africa, where the expertise of technologically-developed countries has supported local knowledge and enthusiasm in helping people acquire the skills to deliver sufficient sustainable supplies of clean drinking water. The danger is that at summits like the Earth Summit, which reflect gross global disparities in economic power, as the UK International Development Secretary recently commented, those countries—such as the USA and most of western Europe—that have plundered and polluted the planet, will now pull up the ladder of growth behind them and impose rules which limit the ability of poor countries to pursue any kind of sustainable economic growth.

The second and related threat of globalization is thus at the level of economic theory and practice. The globalization of economic power has brought with it unprecedented opportunities for the dominance of local economic development in allegedly independent states by the free market model. Market-oriented economic change has brought with it, not freedom for local people to control local economies, but the reverse. Local economic change becomes less under the control of
local or even national interests and is concentrated in the hands of those for whom local community interests are of little concern except as political cover for their programmes. The so-called “banana war” between the USA and the EU (which have been arguing over the heads of local labourers) and which will cause significant job losses on both sides of the Atlantic is but one recent example of this process and there are many other examples where the production and pricing of local commodities such as coffee and sugar have been manipulated in the interests, not of local producers, but of global economic actors. Unprocessed commodities of these kinds account for 70 per cent of all African exports. Yet the added value which produces the high prices charged in European shops is generated by processing within manufacturing plants in Europe, where western companies take the profits, leaving local producers still poor.

Structural adjustment, occasionally supported by military intervention, has undermined the sustainability of local communities worldwide with profound effects for the poor of many countries. who, in the case of women in particular, have often been driven to marginal trading, migration or sexual exploitation. No country is free from this impact but the most vulnerable countries and the poorest people within them suffer the most. In Russia, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet empire—described, perhaps ironically, as the final triumph of the values of competitive capitalism—the emergence of uncontrolled market values has led to soaring unemployment and a huge rise in poverty and in Moscow becoming a crime and Mafia-controlled illegal world economic centre. Women can be seen on the streets attempting to sell their entire possessions in return for enough cash to buy food.

In Britain itself, the consequence of 18 years of free market “virtues” under the Thatcher governments. was enormous social and economic division, a tripling of those in poverty, the return of diseases such as rickets and tuberculosis which were long thought to have been defeated and increasing numbers of older people dying of hypothermia because they could not afford to heat their homes adequately as well as eat. In New Zealand, which most enthusiastically embraced the liberal market experiment of Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, the consequences in the
late 1980s and early 1990s were soaring unemployment, a dismantling of the welfare state and, in due course, the highest suicide rate within OECD countries. In Nigeria the consequence of structural adjustment was that, for the first time since Independence, parents had to pay fees for their children to attend primary school. In South Africa structural adjustment is steadily destroying the value of what was the strongest currency in the whole continent. Argentina’s economy is now effectively destroyed; the picture is a worldwide one.

The “trickle-down” theory of development, which underpins structural adjustment, is thoroughly discredited by those on whose experience it impacts. “Trickle-down” is essentially the theory that says if you give enough to the rich, some will reach the poor; a theory once memorably described by Professor J. K. Galbraith thus: “If you feed enough oats to the horses, some will pass down the road to the sparrows.” The sparrows are certainly not enthusiastic and even the Financial Times, a well-respected but hardly left-of-centre UK financial newspaper, recently noted that the implementation of free market approaches to development in the developed world had actually led to “trickle up” for the bottom income quartile of their populations, that is, that the poorest had got poorer and the richest got richer.

This process of social and economic polarization is common throughout the so-called southern countries, both in terms of material resources but also in access to basic needs. Gaps in income and wealth are widening and access to essentials such as water is increasingly associated with income and wealth. Forty per cent of the world’s population now live without adequate water supplies: on present day trends, and notwithstanding the rhetoric of development aid of rich countries, that proportion may grow to 67 per cent in the next 20 years. UNIDO (2002) has recently reported that the “real per capita income of 30 Southern countries is lower today than it was 35 years ago”.

The unevenness of the process of globalization and of the distribution of its benefits thus promotes obvious paradoxes and conflicts. Here we have space to focus on only one of these, the issue of migration and the resultant growth in racism worldwide. We focus here on the experience of European states, but link it wherever possible to the process of
migration from many African countries. We are not, incidentally, suggesting that racism has emerged simply as a response to the growth of international migration and to the vastly increased numbers of refugees and asylum seekers arriving in western Europe, mainly from Africa and from Central and East Europe and Asia: despite legislation, often the outcome of the struggles of minority groups over the past, racism has been a continuing feature of western societies.

Contemporary forms of migration—often driven by economic change—now, however, provide a new focus that right-wing, chauvinistic and fascist organizations have exploited to promote their racist messages; to which the response of states has been, at best, ambivalent. There is no space here for a detailed analysis of the muddled messages of the so-called “global campaign against terrorism” brought into being by the September 11 bombings (a campaign from which Bush’s family is again making substantial personal profits through its connections with arms manufacturers).

These messages have occasionally appeared close to being Islamophobic and have had a direct effect within many European countries as the anger and violence of some host nationals has been turned against anyone appearing to resemble an Al-Qaida terrorist, even, most tragically, including Afghani refugees who had themselves fled from the Taliban. Such refugees have been attacked and, in some cases, murdered in countries as far apart as the UK and Russia. The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia recently reported that Muslims throughout Europe have suffered more verbal and physical attacks since September 11 within a climate of hostility often generated by “sensationalist and vitriolic media campaigns” (see, for example, The Times 2002). Ironically, what appears at times to be a western campaign against Islamic fundamentalism is led by many who are close to an equally oppressive form of fundamentalism: evangelical Christianity—espoused by Bush’s close colleague, John Ashcroft.

One positive major impact of the “war against terrorism” may, however, be that those living in rich states will no longer fail to see the interconnectedness of debates about poverty and social justice in northern and southern countries. We may all reject the form of the
attacks on the twin towers but one associated message—of anger against rich nations for their role in further impoverishing poor nations—cannot be wished away. As Jordan (2002:120) argues when considering the ways in which national governments hold down taxes to guard against the flight of mobile capital,

[T]here are still more losers than winners in the world from the impact of these forms of global capitalism. And by making the national politics of social justice more difficult—disempowering organized labour, socialist parties and collective action by the disadvantaged—these economic forces are also making spaces and opportunities for other [and less pleasant] kinds of action and critique.

The importance of building the dimensions of social justice into debates on migration has now been emphasized as a result of terrorist and inter-ethnic violence, but perhaps most of all because of the rapid growth of migration. The 33rd Session of the UN Commission on Population and Development heard from the Director of the UN Population Division that “international migration” would become the major demographic issue of the twenty-first century (United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service, 2000), leading to changes in language, religion, ethnicity and nationality and to what he rather circumspectly described as “negative public sentiment and xenophobia”.

Alternatively, and more positively for community development workers, he suggested it might lead to innovation, revitalization and tolerance. Other conference delegates noted the strong gender dimension of international migration, particularly in relation to women being drawn into the sex industry. Although women are about half of all migrants, they are typically found in more exploited situations: more than 60 per cent of Sri Lankan migrants, for example, are women employed as domestic workers—in Europe and the Middle East—with poor pay and no job security and there is increasing evidence of young girls from West African and eastern European countries being brought to western Europe, allegedly as refugees, but in reality as commodities for sexual exploitation.
Quite apart from the many millions of those who are moving within the global marketplace across national boundaries in a search for better living conditions—in some cases forced by dispossession of their livelihood as a result of climate change or the destruction of their own local economies—there are currently upwards of 25 million people worldwide displaced by war or violence within their own countries. Half of these are refugees. Most of these migrants are particularly affected by racism in some form or another. There are more than 150 million international migrants, a figure growing at about 2.5 per cent per year, representing approximately 3 per cent of the world’s population. Many millions more are affected by individual and structural racism within their own societies, even where that has not taken the extreme form of war or inter-ethnic violence.

A brief historical account of racism

Inter-ethnic conflict, itself a legacy of imperial exploitation and vision, has led to hundreds of thousands dead in Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Congo, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Algeria, in Indonesia, in most countries of the Balkans and much of south east and central Asia. In some countries, as in South Africa before 1994, racism has been given a constitutional basis. In Fiji the Indian community is increasingly obstructed from holding political or economic power as it was in Uganda and, in Zimbabwe the cloak of anti-imperialist rhetoric is used to justify inter-ethnic conflict between Shona and Ndebele. It is hardly surprising that racism is such a powerful force in post-colonial societies since it was racism that was used to justify both European domination of their colonies and its specific economic manifestations such as slavery and that manipulated local divisions to ensure control of local economies.

Racism—often framed within cultural and religious imperialism—has driven much of the conflict and exploitation which has characterized the southern world for hundreds of years. Nor are the issues of “race” and migration and of both individual and state-sponsored racist responses to minorities, new phenomena within the domestic landscape of the UK or other northern countries. Eight hundred years ago, for
example, the entire Jewish population of York in England was burned to death by a mob incited by local landowners who wished to avoid repaying their large debts.

Two hundred years later, to paraphrase Fryer (1984), “ethnocentric myths about dark-skinned people from over the sea eased European consciences about enslaving Africans”, thus encouraging the slave trade on which the economic fortunes of many European and American millionaires are still based. This approach to those of presumed inferiority was adopted by all the major imperial powers and few voices dissented. Among these voices was that of Mexican Bishop Bartholeme de Las Casa, who told the Spanish Emperor Charles V, in the light of the mass murder of Mexican Indians by the conquistadores in the sixteenth century, that “no people should be forced to submit to another people on the grounds of a presumed cultural inferiority” and that Christianity could not be propagated by the sword and gun—as it had been by the Crusaders and was subsequently to be done in many other parts of the world. The Emperor Charles’ response was to withdraw his support from the Bishop.

The hostility of wealthy countries towards those of different skin colour extended to its behaviour to the First Nations’ “minorities” colonized during the era of imperialism. For example, the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 ceded government of Aotearoa (New Zealand) to the British Crown but offered some protection to the Maori in terms of continuing possession of and authority over their lands and property, giving them the “rights and privileges of British subjects”. The legal basis of the Treaty is now disputed but it was introduced, in any case, in the expectation, as was also the case in Australia, that those Maori (as with Australian Koorri or native American Indians) who had survived the wars carried out by those wishing to seize their land would die out as a result of imported European diseases such as influenza, or become incorporated into the new western culture.

In Australia, the Aboriginal Koorri, having initially been regarded as not existing at all under the imperial doctrine of Terra Nullius, and despite making some gains, such as the establishment of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Council, still do not have anything like the benefits
of full citizenship of Australia. This situation faces all First Nations people, such as the San in Botswana, who are dominated politically and economically by those within the Botswana government, (representing the dominant Tswana ethnic group) who appear to want to drive the San out of existence, Aboriginal Indians in Canada (where, unlike in Australia, the First Nations people have at least been offered a statement of reconciliation by the federal government), or the First Nations people of Hawaii and the Pacific Islands nations, whose case has yet properly to be heard in other parts of the world.

Despite some advances in their status over the past 200 years, First Nations minorities are still disproportionately represented amongst those who are unemployed, living on low incomes, in prison, with poor education and health outcomes and amongst those dying prematurely. Although aboriginal people have generally had their civil rights and, eventually, their political rights protected, they have yet to achieve full social citizenship. This is one arena where community or social development may have an important role to play.

Everyday contemporary racism
Now the process of migration is effectively reversed. Those without economic prospects from southern countries are migrating in greater and greater numbers to richer countries in search of better work and life opportunities. What they will find is that within the so-called "developed" countries of the north, racism towards residents and migrants alike is an everyday experience. Within the UK, for example, every aspect of Britain's welfare state, for long held to be one of its most progressive political and social achievements, is characterized by racism at both institutional and individual levels (Craig 2000). A recent opinion poll found that roughly one-third of the UK population were prepared to admit that they had racist attitudes. There have been at least 24 racially-motivated murders in Britain since 1991, most of them individual acts of violence on minority ethnic community members across the whole of the UK.

Research (such as Modood 1997, Craig 1999) also demonstrates that it is amongst the poorest that one is most likely to find Britain's minorities.
Britain’s minority ethnic population, now about 7 per cent of the total population, is dominated by those originating from countries which were formerly colonies of Britain and, as in other EU countries, is concentrated in major urban centres. Minority ethnic groups are more likely and, in some cases (particularly Pakistani, Bangladeshi, African-Caribbean and the growing new refugee communities), very much more likely to be in poverty and on the margins of society than the population at large (Craig 1999, Rahman et al. 2000, Britton et al. 2002). It is the continued deprivation of many of Britain’s minority populations, their failure to access welfare or the labour market on anything like equal terms, together with the failure of their own elders to provide effective leadership which, it is argued, has provoked the increasingly frequent disturbances in Britain’s cities over the past few years (Manawar 2003). One response has been these disturbances; another is for young black and Asian community workers to build new forms of leadership.

This structured racism is not limited to the UK, however. For example, the experience of minorities entering the labour market across European countries, from Sweden to Hungary, shows similar patterns, shaped by the same structural response of racism which drives many aspects of European national policymaking (Craig 2002). Structural racism is experienced by immigrant minorities alongside the longer-standing resident native, or “First Nations” ethnic minorities such as the Saami of northern Scandinavia, the Roma of east and central Europe and the Basque of northern Spain and southern France. A recent European review lists, for example, the ways in which racism specifically affects the opportunities of minority or migrant groups in the labour market: migrants frequently suffer from having the least training, the least appropriate skills and as a result are seriously over-represented in unemployment statistics throughout the EU; immigrants and refugees may be blamed if they do find work (“they have taken a job from a local person”), or blamed if they do not work (“living off the welfare benefit system”); much of the available work for minorities is with poor pay, includes shift work, part-time and temporary work without protection and security; minorities, refugees and travellers may find work, but in illegal or particularly
arduous conditions, or in the informal economy; where there is a problem of illegality within the work-force and among minorities and migrants, local populations within Europe blame the illegal or migrant workers for bringing down wages and creating unemployment among the host population; the position of minority groups is also often made more precarious by their lack of language skills and knowledge of local welfare arrangements (such as a lack of social and cultural capital), which impacts on health, social security, education and housing prospects (Craig 2002).

However, racism has taken a new form in recent years. The whole of Europe is now gripped in an intense political debate about refugee and asylum policy which itself builds on longer-standing structural racism. Economic recession across the EU during the last 10 years has led to growing calls for controls on immigration and for the repatriation of existing “foreigners”. These calls lend support to xenophobic campaigns in populist media and to increasing levels of racist violence against religious, ethnic and cultural minorities in countries as different in their culture and immigration history as the UK, Finland, the Netherlands, Greece, Hungary and Germany. Europe is attempting to become “Fortress Europe”, although the planned expansion of the EU to the east will make this problematic. Elliott (2002) suggests that Europe is attempting to become the first “gated” continent, making the parallel with the recently-dismantled Iron Curtain, once separating west from east.

Although immigration has been part of nation-building in countries such as Australia and New Zealand, (as it was briefly in post-war European countries such as Germany and Italy, now hostile to further immigration), it is already clear from the response of the Australian government to the Afghani and other boat people travelling from Indonesia that this fortress mentality is influencing more prosperous countries in other world regions. The European political response has been one more explicitly driven by racism than for many years, particularly prompted by the growth of asylum-seeking throughout Europe, where more than 330,000 people are now seeking leave to remain.
Many northern countries are now witnessing the growth of explicitly racist parties. In the recent French Presidential elections, the party of the Far Right succeeded in reaching the second stage of the ballot, driving the left's candidate out of office in so doing; in the Netherlands, the party of a maverick right-wing candidate with pronouncedly hostile views on immigration, advocating the repatriation of Muslim residents, achieved the second largest number of seats despite—or perhaps partly because of—his assassination shortly before the general election; and Germany’s Chancellor Schröder warned against a similar possibility ahead of recent German elections, whilst his predecessor, Schmidt—moving further to the right in line with many political leaders in Europe—argues that Germans want no more immigration.

Racism is thus emerging as a formal national and transnational political response to migration, giving apparent legitimacy to an increased level of racist violence such as arson attacks, murder and casual violence. Racist political organization, supported by the Internet, now has a transnational character: for example, fascists of UK nationality were implicated in arson attacks in Germany and the Internet is manipulated by football followers promoting racist views. Even countries traditionally viewed as tolerant now witness the growth of influential racist political movements, such as the semi-fascist Danish People’s Party, with popularity ratings as high as 15 per cent, which, as part of a centre-right governing coalition, argues for the repatriation of immigrants. European countries as far afield as Norway, Austria, Portugal, Italy and Belgium each have governments similarly dependent on the support of racist parties.

The growth of racist violence makes the social and economic position of migrants even more precarious, adding to their political marginalization, not least because many of even the most long-standing minority groups tend to occupy jobs within the service sector that make them physically exposed. For example, in what is regarded as another progressive social democratic regime, Sweden: the rate of unemployment amongst non-Nordic residents doubled in the 1990s to 61 per cent (Craig 2002); in parts of Hungary and Rumania, the unemployment rates of local Roma population are even higher.
Many refugees and asylum seekers arrive from Africa and elsewhere at the shores of EU countries having been supported by exploitative and criminal gangs, travelling in appalling conditions in overcrowded and unsafe boats or in stifling lorries, for which privilege they pay huge sums of money either up front or by instalments on entering local labour markets. Some have paid with their lives, such as those in one lorry, opened at an English port two years ago to reveal a cargo of 58 young Chinese men suffocated to death; or the eight Turkish refugees who were found dead in the back of another container lorry opened last year in Southern Ireland; African refugees, reportedly thrown overboard by unscrupulous seafarers; or those symbolized by the crosses marking graves on the Mexican side of its barbed-wire border with the USA.

The political stance of “developed” governments to migrants is, at best, ambivalent but it has been growing increasingly hostile. Most European countries have created structures, policies and legislation over the past 30 years which, though clearly ineffective in practice, represent attempts to provide protection for minorities against discrimination. At the same time, however, calls for immigration control have grown steadily and the increased flow of refugees and migrants has sharpened these contradictions. The treatment of refugees and asylum seekers is increasingly harsh and racist, starting generally from the assumption that they are actually not fleeing from a well-founded fear of persecution, but simply seeking a better economic standard of living.

Northern governments are attempting to build barriers to trade in labour to their own advantage, in a way which mirrors their trade in goods, services and commodities. At the same time as global corporations are increasingly manipulating the local economies of poor countries and driving many to migrate in search of work, access to that work is increasingly being managed by rich countries in ways which ensure that migrants deliver their work with as little call on the resources of rich economies as possible. Those few migrants who achieve refugee status are provided with the poorest housing and a subsistence income, below that of even the poorest settled minorities. This racist treatment is not, however, meted out to white migrants from Commonwealth
countries and returning UK citizens who actually form the largest single group of immigrants to the UK; nor, for example, to the aussiedler, who are people deemed to be of German origin and who, despite having lived in Poland or Russia for years, are treated as Germans when they decide to return to live in Germany, whilst long-standing “Germans” of Turkish or Yugoslav origin are regarded as non-citizens.

Within “developed” societies, racism now performs two functions: firstly, to allow people of different skin colour to be exploited economically and secondly, to create the conditions for them to be used as political scapegoats: for example in relation to crime and drug-taking or more general economic decline. Many countries claiming to be peacefully multicultural, such as Britain, France and Germany are, as Favell (2002) argues, already deeply polarized and worse may follow. Their huge disparities in income and wealth; often strongly associated with ethnicity and a direct result of their adoption of unregulated market forces, are now impacting strongly on traditional white working class communities which have proved to be fertile recruiting grounds for the parties of the political far right.

Paradoxically, many European countries have followed others in waking to the problem of labour shortages in specific areas of the economy. Some commentators now argue that western European countries may need to increase in-migration to cope with the effects of demographic change. The UN Population Division estimates that the population of the 15 EU countries and those bidding for membership will fall by 15 per cent to 628 million in the next 50 years, leaving labour deficits in many labour market areas. The same tensions are apparent in the USA. In 1996 a powerful lobby within Congress both fought to cut benefit for immigrants and opposed tighter restrictions on immigration. As a result, the numbers of migrants entering the USA that year, at over one million, was the highest for more than 80 years (Clarke and Fox Piven 2001); but they will be amongst the poorest of America’s residents, finding places only at the bottom of the labour market. Similarly, within rich countries of the Middle East, cheap imported labour—on a time-limited basis—from countries such as Pakistani, Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Indonesia, has filled jobs in the low-paid service
sector economy—nannying, chauffeuring, providing nursing care, cleaning—for many years. For some of these migrants the level of economic exploitation borders on slavery: that is, the use of human labour as an economic commodity in the context of the simultaneous denial of their human rights.

We are also witnessing in western Europe the gradual emergence of what is effectively a new slave trade within the very different contemporary contexts of economic globalization: a large-scale movement of refugees, represented most sharply perhaps by the illegal trade in young women of east and central European, African and south east Asian origins. This slavery mirrors that of other countries—in the experience of domestic workers employed in many countries with no security of abode, of child sex slaves in Thailand, Christian brick workers in Pakistan, bonded labourers in India (where one 12 year-old child leader of opposition to the employing gangs was recently assassinated), the charcoal workers of Brazil and the black African slaves of Mauritania.

Ironically, although the place of past generations of migrants in the labour market has been in the worst sectors of the economy, with unsocial conditions such as continuous night shifts, low pay, higher health risks and lack of security: most worrying—to government—is that the gaps now appearing in northern labour markets require those with high profile and marketable skills, such as doctors, nurses, engineers and computer programmers. Contradictorily, too, there is now growing formal awareness of the economic benefits that migration brings to local economies: in Britain, for example, it is clear that the many migrants working, for example in the British construction industry, from as far away as Russia are not depriving local people of jobs but are, as one press report put it, “helping to combat severe labour shortages, easing inflationary pressures and helping to keep interest rates low for everybody with a mortgage.” The south pays the price, however. Within many African health services, for example, there is a shortage of nurses: the answer to this problem lies in part in western Europe which is increasingly drawing trained personnel away from southern countries.

Contradictions are thus beginning to appear in Europe’s racist immigration and asylum policies as countries seek to open a small window
of opportunity to these high status refugees, despite the fact that it makes a mockery of such countries’ claims about the purely economic motives of the mass of refugees. This approach also runs counter to notions of sustainable development aid to the southern countries from which these migrants come and provides a parallel, in terms of the loss of critical labour market skills, to the economic disinvestment in poorer countries which increasingly characterizes globalization as a whole. In European countries which have been moving towards a high dependency ratio of non-economically active to economically active people, migrants are now also being looked to again as a source of cheap labour to provide caring services for the growing population of older people: a tendency that will add further to the general labour market marginalization of minorities.

The response of community development
How can community or social development confront these processes on behalf of the poorest and most marginalized people? I have argued that globalization already presents many challenges to those active in community development (Craig 1998) but the growth of racism is perhaps one of the greatest, confronting the most basic values of community development. The conditions created by globalization—of economic exploitation and division, with concomitant political division—are precisely those under which racism thrives, placing the weakest economic actors at greatest risk (Castles and Davidson 2000). This is now the global context in which community development has to find a role, to ensure the development of a socially just society which properly includes those who offer their labour to, and who seek to be full members of, “developed” communities and upon whom the basic welfare structures and services of such countries now increasingly depend.

In developed countries faced with an increase in racism at local level, community development workers have had agendas defined for them by local racist victimization and it is here that the most obvious and immediate responses of community development are being made (Community Development Journal 2003). Building on local knowledge, networks and experience, development workers have organized to
combat the racist pronouncements of government. But what might be the role of community development at a broader and strategic level to confronting racism? And how can we turn the processes inherent in globalization to the advantage of its victims?

Community development (Craig 1998), is both a practice, with a set of skills and techniques, and a broad philosophical approach to working with people; one which strives to give ordinary people a voice for expressing and acting on their needs and desires and, through the process of participating in this approach to social change, offers people, particularly the most powerless and deprived, support for their empowerment.

It is a practice whose potential for positive and peaceful social change has been recognized worldwide (Craig and Mayo 1995). First of all, then, community development’s response has to be one which promotes its value base; it should, for example, challenge the appearance of racism in whatever form it takes and support the development of local responses and solutions to social and economic problems.

Social development now has also to work in the local context of the arrival of refugees and asylum seekers, usually in fairly hostile environments, where there is competition for basic resources, where there has been frequently little history of previous migrant settlement and where little development work is done with local residents before substantial numbers of refugees arrive. It is work, as with social development work in areas of ethnic conflict elsewhere, in areas of violence or inter-ethnic conflict or war, that often places the community worker at personal risk (Lovett et al. 1994; Community Development Journal 1998).

Despite the forces ranged against it, the role of community and social development workers in the context of globalization and the growing dominance of neo-liberal economic agendas can be critical. These people and their projects can be used—perhaps manipulated might be a better term—to help the poor adjust peacefully to the management of neo-liberal economic change. or they can—as they have done, from Brazil to India and Mexico to Malaysia, help the poor and less powerful to give voice to their own concerns and needs.
Community development workers can collude with those who use the terms “community” and “community development” without any real political commitment to their true meanings—they can pretend to “love the people”, in the words of the Chipko—or they can assert the basic principles of community development to articulate and organize around the needs of the most deprived; placing them at the front rather than the end of political debate. Social and community development can confront the forces of destructive nationalism and racism, as it has done in Northern Ireland, South Africa and even Yugoslavia, building bridges based on the values of common humanity between communities whose political leaders have placed them at war.

Community development can also contribute to sustainable development and there are many examples now of such development, built on a combination of local control and outside technology appropriate to local contexts. For example, millions of Third World farms, supported by social development expertise, are already using low-tech innovations to increase production (*Times Higher Education Supplement*, 23 August 2002). One such programme is in Kenya, where farmers plant particular weeds in maize fields as pest attractants.

Organizing on the basis of the values of community development, however, will also increasingly need to be done at an international level because that is the level at which the economic processes that continue to do so much damage to the prospects of the poorest people in the poorest countries, are to be found. This is the level at which international NGOs can make a contribution in encouraging the development of global links between local activists around issues such as racism—links strongly developed, for example, during the 2001 United Nations World Conference Against Racism. One potential benefit of the global growth of electronic communication has been the ability to network effectively across national boundaries to create mass campaigns, although there are many countries, particularly in parts of Africa and central Asia, which are still information poor.

The oppositional events of Seattle, Prague, Davos, Quebec and Genoa; the work of the NGO forum organizing around the 2000 World Social Development Summit Recall Conference in Geneva; the growing...
influence of the World Social Forum, demonstrated at its recent huge meeting in Porto Alegre in Brazil, attended by 12,000 people from 120 countries; and the huge attendance of different groups at the 2001 anti-racism Congress have all shown the potential ways in which electronic networking can be an organizing tool; a tool increasingly exploited by community development workers to network, share information and build campaigns.

This kind of action is one of the forms of global action referred to by Edwards and Gaventa in their typology of global citizen action (Edwards and Gaventa 2001). They argue that “through community organizations, social movements, issue campaigns and policy advocacy, citizens have found ways to have their voices heard and to influence the decisions and practices of larger institutions that affect their lives” (p.277). Their typology—based on the unfamiliar notion of “think locally, act globally”—includes not only action on or against global institutions (which have had significant local and regional impacts), but transnational campaigns on issues of mutual concern: action to realize or promote rights offered by global treaties and agreements (such as freedom from debt, or freedom from domestic violence against women) and a generalized level of support for the right to participate in “decision-making in social, economic, cultural and political life, within and across the local, national and global arenas (Edwards and Gaventa 2001:278).

Here is a huge agenda for community development workers, particularly in relation to “building from the bottom up” or “globalization from below” and in helping local groups move from campaign slogans to constituencies for change, linking local to regional to national and supranational arenas. Edwards and Gaventa (2001: 282–3) also argue that global citizen action “is strengthened by participatory forms of research, increasingly sophisticated policy analysis, and continuous organizational learning”, all processes to which community development can make a strong contribution. In relation specifically to issues around racism and migration, with their transnational agendas, community development workers can play a critical role in building links between communities both within and across national borders, through networking, research and basic organizational skills.
Two grounded examples of the ways in which international community development organization can be done are illustrated by work with the San bushmen of the Kalahari desert. National boundaries cut across the San’s traditional lands, spreading the San across six countries; a similar geopolitical reality to that which has divided the Saami in northern Scandinavia and the Roma of eastern and central Europe. A small community development trust working with the San has helped to create a single independent campaigning organization, bringing representatives together across these national boundaries. This organization is pressing all the governments of the region for better treatment for the San. This work is a useful reminder too that racism is not the preserve of white groups: many of the San groups are the victims of racist ideologies perpetrated by black-led governments. Similarly, representatives of the Roma from many European countries have been meeting in recent years to build a solidarity and transnational campaign for their rights.

The other strategy being pursued by the San Kuru Community Development Trust is to draw together indigenous peoples from all over the world for consultations based on common themes of empowerment, culture and spirituality. The first such independent consultation, held in Botswana in 1998, brought together people from all countries where San are resident, as well as indigenous people from the USA; Canada, Kenya, Norway, Brazil and Australia. It is hoped that future such events will draw on a wider range of groups including Maori groups, who have a more advanced constitutional position than most aboriginal/First Nations minorities. These consultations looked at the importance of culturally-shaped income-generating activities, the need for training, literacy and human resource development and cultural programmes to counter marginalization, support self-respect and promote indigenous arts and craft production. They also produced a manifesto of resolutions concerned with fighting dependency and promoting solidarity and gender equality, as well as the significance of traditional customs and spiritual beliefs and the protection of traditional territories: that is, a claim for universal human rights allied to specific cultural rights. Although these developments have been stimulated in part by community development workers, they are now largely run by
indigenous people themselves. There remains, however, a strong role for community development worldwide to facilitate more and stronger links between these First Nation and minority ethnic national groups.

Other examples of international action, building on the techniques of community development, are the growth of campaigns around issues such as child or female sexual trade between countries, or in opposition to tourism to areas such as Myanmar where there are oppressive regimes. In both these instances, local campaigning groups in countries from both the north and the south, using community organization skills, have linked or responded to calls from specific southern countries to build global campaigns of opposition.

These campaigns may be directed towards legislative ends to provide a framework which can be used as a lever against discriminatory policies and practices. For example, promoted by the work of local community-based organizations, growing awareness of racism and discrimination within many EU member states, has led to the European Union recently agreeing a Directive that enforces the principle of equal treatment, based on the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. This encourages "appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation" and requires most member states to rewrite their legislation by the end of 2002. The UN itself, consequent on community-based lobbies emerging from the 2001 World Congress Against Racism, has now moved to establish an anti-discrimination unit within the UNHCHR machinery specifically to address the growth of racism.

Racism has long been a global phenomenon; but economic globalization—with its drivers for migration from south to north—now promotes the growth of new, dangerous forms of racism and ethnic division. These few examples suggest some ways in which community development can contribute both locally and globally to anti-racist work. Recent events and the wider globalizing context of growing migration both within economic and refugee contexts suggests that the task of combating racism is likely to need to grow. However, as Noam Chomsky put it; anything can be reformed, even if it takes many years of international and local campaigning and struggle at many levels, as in the case of apartheid.
South Africa or America’s war against Vietnam, or brief moments of mass mobilization, as in Serbia and the Philippines. In Chomsky’s view, popular mood and popular action can make a significant difference in how institutions, structures and policies are reformed. The task of those concerned with the values of social justice and social development, in their personal and professional practice, is to help to create the conditions for both mood and action, at whatever level and in whatever forums they work, against the crime of racism. It is an urgent task.

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